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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community generally agrees that trade and en-
vironmental policies should mutually promote sustainable develop-
ment.1 At the same time, however, "trade policy measures for
environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade."2
While in theory global trade liberalization and environmental
protection are equally laudable goals, recent attempts by individual
governments to restrict the international trade in tropical timber prod-
ucts illustrate the difficulty of applying these competing principles in
1. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 874, 878 (Principle 12 declares that "[s]tates should cooperate to promote a support-
ive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sus-
tainable development in all countries").
2. Id.
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practice.3 Nevertheless, if sustainable economic growth is the ultimate
objective, then the future relationship between trade and the environ-
ment must become more symbiotic.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the extent to which en-
vironmentally motivated trade practices (sometimes called "eco-pro-
tectionist measures") relating to tropical timber products conflict with
the rules of the neoliberal trade system built around the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 Assuming that all import
and export restrictions have at least some effect on the international
trade in tropical timber, many questions arise.
For example, does the GATI' recognize any article XX excep-
tions that could be used to justify unilateral attempts to promote sus-
tainable development? Moreover, what role has multilateral
cooperation played in the international tropical timber trade, and
what role can it reasonably be expected to play in the future? Are
unilateral trade restrictions the best approach to deal with environ-
mental externalities?5 If not, then are there superior alternatives that
could promote sustainable development of tropical forests without
hindering global trade liberalization efforts? The answers to these
specific questions regarding tropical forests will, in turn, have implica-
tions for the broader issue of whether freer trade necessarily dimin-
ishes world welfare by fostering environmental degradation.
This Article focuses on the potential effects of these trade policies
on the depletion of tropical forests. However, before these and other
questions can be explored, we must first understand the background
of the basic problem: What is tropical deforestation? Where is it oc-
curring and at what rate?
After the primary causes of tropical deforestation have been enu-
merated, this Article will discuss the economic and ecological impact
of tropical deforestation. What consequences does tropical deforesta-
tion hold for the world timber trade and the environment?
3. The conflict between economic growth and environmental protection is not limited
to the tropical timber dispute, for the impact of international trade on the environment has
been called "one of the most divisive issues in the interaction between economics and
ecology." Panayotis N. Varangis et al., Tropical Timber Trade Policies: What Impact Will
Eco-Labeling Have? 1 (Mar. 22-23, 1993) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Envi-
ronmental Symposium organized by the Economic Chamber of Austria, on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Varangis].
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
5. Environmental externalities exist because of inefficient markets that consistently
undervalue natural resources such as tropical forests. Varangis, supra note 3, at 4.
19941
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International efforts to prevent tropical deforestation, primarily
within the framework of the International Tropical Timber Agree-
ment, will then be evaluated. In order to compare these multilateral
efforts with unilateral measures, a summary of the recent Austrian ex-
perience with tropical timber import restrictions will be presented.
The reaction of various Southeast Asian countries will also be
detailed.
With a basis for comparison thus established between multilateral
action on the one hand and domestic action on the other, it will then
be possible to examine the GATT legality of the numerous unilateral
measures available for restricting the international tropical timber
trade. Since the majority of these measures raise legitimate concerns
under the world trading system, additional GAIT-consistent alterna-
tives will be mentioned briefly, followed by a few concluding remarks.
H. BACKGROUND
Since 1900, more than half of the world's tropical rain forests
have been destroyed and the land converted to other uses.6 A 1990
United Nations (U.N.) study concluded that tropical rain forests are
disappearing at a rate of seventeen million hectares per year,7 and
some scientists predict that the remaining tropical forests will be gone
by the end of this century. 8 Obviously, when deforestation occurs at
such a rapid rate, it is bound to have serious environmental and social
consequences, many of which are not yet fully understood. Others
theorize that the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources such
as tropical rain forests could result in environmental conditions being
modified dramatically enough to end human life on this planet.9 Be-
cause of its potentially devastating implications, deforestation will
continue to be an issue of worldwide significance during the 1990s.
6. 136 CONG. REc. E3534 (daily ed. Oct. 26,1990) (statement of Rep. Doug Walgren)
[hereinafter Walgren].
7. BRIAN JOHNSON, RESPONDING TO TROPICAL DEFORESTATION: AN ERUPTION Or
CRIsEs-AN ARRAY OF SOLUTIONS 7 (1991) (World Wildlife Fund & Conservation
Found., Osborn Ctr. Research Paper).
8. William R. Long, Rain Forest Boycott Questioned, L.A. TMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at
El. By contrast, a recent study conducted by World Bank economists disputes the argu-
ment that tropical forests will be totally depleted by the end of this century, calling such
predictions "farfetched." Varangis, supra note 3, at 4.
9. See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
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A. Distinguishing Between Tropical and Non-Tropical
Deforestation
Deforestation can be defined as the process by which land is
cleared of forests or trees."0 Deforestation, which is sometimes eu-
phemistically called "timber extraction," occurs throughout the devel-
oped and developing world and can be seen as a by-product of
industrialization and development programs. For purposes of this Ar-
ticle, the difference between tropical deforestation and non-tropical
deforestation is crucial.
At least in the developed world, many people tend to focus their
attention primarily on deforestation occurring in tropical rain forests
within the developing world, usually in Brazil's Amazonia." That
perspective, however, is only partially accurate, for it fails to consider
a second, equally controversial form of non-tropical deforestation that
is occurring right in the developed world's own back yard. In the
United States, for example, there is significant opposition to timber
extraction of old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest.12 Another
example of rapid, non-tropical deforestation may be occurring in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, most notably in Russia.1 3 In
international discussions, the latter examples of non-tropical defores-
tation should not be so quickly dismissed, since they raise the same
sustainable development concerns as tropical deforestation. 4
10. See WVEBSTER'S Nw WORLD DxcrioNAR OF THE Am.EMCArN LANGUAGE 371
(1990). Even if a forest is not totally cleared, it can be "degraded" to the point at %hich it
is considered deforested. JoHNsoN, supra note 7, at 1.
11. Brazil's Amazonian forests contain nearly 31% of the world's rain forest and cover
an area half as large as the United States. Roseann Eshbach, Comment, A Global Ap-
proach to the Protection of the Environment Balancing State Sovereignt and Global Inter-
ests, 4 TEhn,. INT'L L.J. 271, 273 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, The Owl and the Lumberjack Can Clinton Brca 1 the
Logfam?, WASH. Pos, Apr. 2, 1993, at A4 (noting that of the original 25 million acres of
the Pacific Northwest's old-growth forest, only about 10% of the forest remains standing).
If logging continues at the current rate, these forests will disappear within 20 years. Par-
pose of This Newsletter, in Mons No KoE: JAPAN AND THE WoraD's FORES,, July 1992,
at 1 (on file with author) [hereinafter Morn No KoE 1] (mori no kee means "voice of the
forest" in Japanese).
13. Siberia Alert Russian Scientist Visits Japan, in MOr No KOE: JAPAN A';D THE
Wo.LD's FoRESTS, Oct. 1992, at 15 (on file with author) [hereinafter Moiu No Kor II].
Siberia contains about 54% of the world's coniferous forests. Id.
14. Because developed countries often have records of resource abuse and pollution
and because these countries' proposals for rain forest conservation typically fail to consider
non-tropical deforestation, such proposals are widely resented in the developing %.orld as
an unjustified interference with national sovereignty over domestic resources. For a typical
response by a political leader in the developing world, see Jonathan Thatcher, Rif-c Colin-
ries Urged to Exercise Restraint, REUTERS, Feb. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Ne'is Li-
1994]
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To date, however, tropical deforestation has received the lion's
share of attention, even though it is clear that all deforestation, includ-
ing that which takes place in tropical forests, has a significant adverse
impact on the environment. The developed world's tendency toward
ignoring its own serious deforestation problems causes great resent-
ment on the part of governments in the undeveloped southern coun-
tries (South), which understandably feel that their forest policies are
unfairly singled out for criticism at the international level.
B. Tropical Forest Location
There are three types of forest zones in the world: tropical, tem-
perate, and boreal. 15 By definition, tropical rain forests grow between
the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn.16 They primarily
consist of dense evergreen forests in which the annual rainfall aver-
ages more than eighty inches and temperatures range from sixty-eight
to eighty-two degrees Fahrenheit.17 Temperate forests, on the other
hand, are found between the tropics and the Arctic or Antarctic cir-
cles.18 Boreal forests are located within the Arctic circle, in such
countries as Norway, Sweden, and Finland.19 When compared to
tropical and temperate forests, boreal forests account for only a small
fraction of the world's total forest area, but they are nonetheless con-
sidered to be important ecological resources.20 When taken as a
brary, Reuter File (noting Indonesian President Suharto's comment that "[a]s developing
countries are suffering from abject poverty, the advanced countries are wasting resources
and polluting the environment as a result of an erroneous lifestyle").
15. Since there are three forest zones, tropical, temperate, and boreal, it logically fol-
lows that there are also three types of deforestation. The problems of temperate and bo-
real deforestation are beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, this Article will focus
exclusively on deforestation as it is occurring within the tropical zone. It is important to
remember, however, that non-tropical deforestation also contributes to global warming.
16. S. 1159, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1991). Rain forests are easily distinguishable
from jungles in several important ways. For example, tropical rain forests never have a dry
season. The Quiz, N.Y. Timrs, Apr. 4, 1993, at 4A, 12 (Educ. Life Supp.). Most of the
trees have broad leaves that never fall. Moreover, because little sunlight filters through the
thick treetops, there is relatively little undergrowth on the rain forest floor. Jungles, by
contrast, are characterized by dense, low vegetation and may occur in either wet or dry
climates. Some jungles, unlike their stereotypes, have few trees and consist mostly of
thickets of low shrubs. Id.
17. The Quiz, supra note 16, at 12.
18. President Bush Unveils First $16 Million in Forests for Future Initiative Projects,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied File
[hereinafter Forests for Future Initiative Projects].
19. Id.
20. It is interesting to note that a new coalition was formed in April 1992 for the
purposes of preserving boreal forest ecosystems. New Boreal Forest Protection Group
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whole, temperate and boreal forests comprise fifty-eight percent of
the world's total forest area.2"
Tropical moist forests can be found throughout Central and South
America, Southeast Asia, and West-Central Africa. These forests
cover an area of 1.5 billion hectares, which represents forty-two per-
cent of the world's total forest area3P Of these tropical moist forests,
slightly more than 650 million hectares are tropical rain forests. This
is equivalent to an area over three times the size of the European
Community (EC).24 About one billion hectares of closed tropical for-
ests are located in fifteen developing countries. 2 Among these devel-
oping countries, Brazil, Indonesia, and Zaire possess the largest
existing holdings of tropical forests in the world.26 Brazil and Indone-
sia, like many other countries, experienced substantial increases in de-
forestation rates during the 1980s and early 1990s.27
C. Tropical Forest Depletion Rates
The rate at which tropical forests are disappearing is hotly con-
tested. Depletion rate estimates range from fourteen million to
twenty million hectares of tropical forest per year.28 Analyses indi-
cate, however, that deforestation or "depletion rates" are increasing
over time, as timber-harvesting technology improves. For example, in
1988, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated a
worldwide tropical forest depletion rate during the early 1980s of 11A
million hectares per year.29 In contrast, in 1992, the FAO gave a re-
vised depletion rate estimate of 16.9 million hectares per year, which
Formed, in Moui No KoE I, supra note 12, at 9. The new coalition is called the Interna-
tional Working Group on Boreal Forests and is based in Jokkmokk, Sweden. Id.
21. Varangis, supra note 3, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. C.A. Primo Braga, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy The Cases of Indonesia and
Brazil, in INr'L TRADE & ENV'T 173,175 (World Bank Discussion Papers, Patrick Low ed.,
1992).
26. The other 12 countries, in order of their tropical forest holdings, are Peru, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Bolivia, India, Papua New Guinea, Myanmar (Burma), Venezuela, Congo,
Malaysia, Gabon, and Cameroon. Id. at 175-76.
27. Id. at 175. India had the highest average annual rate of deforestation (4.1%); Ga-
bon, Papua New Guinea, and the Congo all had the lowest (0.1%) average annual rate of
deforestation. Id. at 176.
28. Varangis, supra note 3, at 3.
29. Id.
1994]
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is equivalent to 0.9 percent of the existing tropical moist forest area,
for the longer time frame of 1981 to 1990.30
These increasing forest depletion rates have already had an ad-
verse impact on the economies of several developing countries in-
volved in the tropical timber trade.31 The Philippines, for instance,
went from being a large net exporter of tropical timber in the 1960s
and 1970s to a net importer during the 1980s. 32 One study concludes
that if forest depletion rates of the 1980s continue into the 1990s, the
number of net tropical timber exporters will fall from thirty-three to
less than ten by the end of this century.33
III. PRIMARY CAUSES OF TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION
The primary causes of tropical deforestation are well known. Ex-
treme poverty and population growth are among the principal causes.
Conversion of forests to alternative uses, including agricultural pro-
duction, cattle ranching, and commercial logging, and the demand for
fuelwood are additional leading factors that directly contribute to the
environmental losses.3 4 The precise contribution of each of these ac-
tivities to forest depletion is unknown, but one study suggests that
sixty-four percent of tropical forest depletion can be attributed to ag-
ricultural conversion, eighteen percent to commercial logging, ten per-
cent to the actions of fuel gatherers, and eight percent to cattle
ranching.35 Significantly, tropical timber exports, either as logs or
processed timber, account for only one percent of all trees felled in
developing countries.36 United Nations and World Bank estimates
lend additional support to these figures.37
30. Id.
31. Thailand has almost completely depleted its tropical forests. Philip Shenon, Now
It's the Jungle That the Khmer Rouge Decimates, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, at D4. Conse-
quently, it has been forced to turn to its neighbor, Cambodia, for additional supplies. Id.
32. Varangis, supra note 3, at 3.
33. Id. This prediction could have far-reaching effects on the composition of the Inter-
national Tropical Timber Organization, which is discussed below in subpart VI(A).
34. Braga, supra note 25, at 177.
35. Id.
36. OFFIcn OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICTS
AND OPPORTUNmES 43 (1992) [hereinafter OTA].
37. Braga, supra note 25, at 177. World Bank studies conclude that 60% of annual
tropical deforestation is caused by agricultural settlement, with the remaining 40% split
evenly between commercial logging and other uses, such as road construction, urbanization
programs, and fuelvood gathering. Id. According to U.N. estimates, less than 4% of all
timber removed from tropical forests is exported. JoHNsON, supra note 7, at 10.
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These activities and various other human activities will be consid-
ered in the order of their relative contribution to tropical deforesta-
tion. Although outlined separately for ease of discussion, it is
important to remember that these factors do not exist independently
in the real world; they interact within a single dynamic relationship.
Thus, while timber extraction itself accounts for a certain amount of
forest depletion, it also fosters agricultural use by providing greater
access (that is, logging roads) to the forest's interior.
A. Poverty and Population Growth
The principal causes underlying tropical forest destruction are ex-
treme poverty and population growth. -s In the last fifty years, the
world's population has grown from two billion to five billion, and pop-
ulation experts predict that there will be 7.5 billion people worldwide
by 2035.?9 The overwhelming majority of this growth is occurring in
the developing world, which leads to Malthusian predictions about
land and natural resource scarcity.40 Likewise, poverty, malnutrition,
disease, and early death can be expected to increase exponentially j '
Excluding China, approximately three billion people currently
live in the world's tropics and subtropics, and 750 million of these peo-
ple live in absolute poverty in the tropics.4z Given these figures, tropi-
cal forest land is often perceived by governments in the developing
world as a "safety valve" for population increases and as a "cushion"
against domestic political pressure for land reform.4 3 Since these gov-
ernments control seventy-five percent of the world's tropical forests,
landless forest colonists in search of empty terrain will probably con-
tinue to put the most significant pressure on rain forest preservation
efforts. 4 Moreover, as the world's population continues to rise, mi-
gration pressures on the tropical forests can be expected to continue
growing massively in the coming decades 45
38. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 2.
39. 1l at 14.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 1&
43. 1& at 2.
44. Ld. at 14.
45. 1&
1994]
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B. Clearance for Agricultural and Cattle Ranching Purposes
"Slash and bum" agricultural techniques and ranching practices
are the two leading causes of direct tropical forest destruction.46 For
example, after loggers and road builders clear trails into a rain forest's
vast interior, farmers and cattle ranchers typically clear surrounding
forests with chain saws and, more devastatingly, with fire.47
The soil in tropical forests possesses few minerals and nutrients.
As a result, most tropical forest vegetation feeds and grows on other
dying vegetation in an efficient growth-from-decomposition cycle that
takes place almost entirely above ground.4 8 After large areas of a
tropical forest have been cleared, however, the soil in tropical forests
varies from fair to poor quality49 and erodes easily.50 Because of the
soil's increasing infertility after a tropical forest has been cleared, the
cattle ranchers' grazing activities and the farmers' food crops gener-
ally dwindle or are exhausted after two or three seasons.-" Once the
land is no longer profitable, the cattle ranchers and farmers are forced
to move on, and the cleared land remains a virtual wasteland.
C. Wood and Timber Extraction
It is difficult to separate the removal of wood for commercial pur-
poses from the removal of timber for firewood.52 A recent U.N.
study, conducted by the FAO, found that seventeen percent of all
wood removals in this category of wood and timber extraction were
for commercial purposes, ranging from the construction of furniture
and houses to shipbuilding and joinery.53 The remaining eighty-three
percent of wood and timber extraction resulted from domestic fire-
wood collection.54 In countries of the South, wood is frequently seen
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
48. Walgren, supra note 6, at E3534.
49. JoHNsoN, supra note 7, at 11.
50. Eshbach, supra note 11, at 275.
51. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 11.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id. Tropical timber is especially sought after in world markets because of its lack
of knots and inexpensive price. MoRi No KoE I, supra note 12, at 1; see also German
Wood Manufacturers to Selectively Import Tropical Timber, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANOE
REP., Mar. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (noting that tropical
wood's special characteristics also include its long life and resistance to rot) [hereinafter
German Wood Manufacturers].
54. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 10; see also WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DE-VELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FtrURE 15 (1987) (noting that "[m]illions of people in
the developing world are short of fuelwood") [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
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as an inexpensive source of energy, needed to fulfill heating and cook-
ing needs.
D. Government Development Programs
Government schemes to promote development are as varied as
they are destructive. Although virgin forest land has little economic
value for a developing country, once such land is cleared and occu-
pied, it has great political value. Governments recognize that shanty-
town slums, which have sprung up around many cities as a by-product
of rapid industrialization and modernization efforts, represent poten-
tial flashpoints of civil unrest 5 By opening up "land without people
for people without land," it is hoped that resettlement programs will
discourage anti-government sentiment by spreading the poor inhabit-
ants out over a greater, more diffuse area. Such government "devel-
opment" programs will likely continue as long as tropical forests have
a greater political value than economic value.
Compounding the problem are more conventional government
development programs initiated to encourage the construction of
large industrial projects, which include ports, bridges, highways,
mines, and dams.56 The purpose of these industrial projects is to en-
hance the country's infrastructure and to provide raw materials or en-
ergy for industrial processes located elsewhere.57 Such programs not
only destroy thousands of hectares of tropical forest directly, but also
contribute to the indirect loss of tens of thousands more hectares of
tropical forest due to the landless settlers, forest colonizers, and
ranchers that soon follow.
E. Exports
Until very recently, the most important misconception about the
underlying causes of tropical deforestation was the perception that
tropical timber extraction for export was mainly to blame for tropical
deforestation s In fact, timber extraction for export is less responsi-
ble for tropical deforestation than are all of the above-outlined activi-
ties. 9 This fact cannot be overlooked in the debate on whether the
international trade in tropical timber should be restricted for environ-
55. JoHNSON, supra note 7, at 12.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 9.
59. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text; accord 1991 OJ. (C 315) 19 (noting
that "[t]he volume of tropical timber traded on the international market accounts for only
1994]
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mental purposes. It sheds light on how relatively insignificant an effect
such environmental restrictions in the developed northern countries
(North) have on the South's conduct.
For example, according to a recent study prepared by the FAO,
developing states produced 1.92 billion square meters of tropical tim-
ber in 1989.60 Of this area, only eighty million square cubic meters of
tropical timber were exported.61 According to these same FAO statis-
tics, of the eighty million square meters of tropical timber exported,
forty percent of the timber went to other developing countries (mostly
in Asia), thirty-two percent went to Japan, twenty-four percent went
to Europe and other industrialized countries, and four percent went to
the United States and Canada. 62 Because only about one to four per-
cent of all timber removed from tropical forests is exported,63 the
World Bank has concluded that "[timber extraction] activities geared
to the domestic market ... are the main players in the deforestation
process.
64
Without more, however, this one to four percent figure is some-
what misleading, for it fails to disclose the relative economic value of
tropical timber exports as sources of foreign exchange earnings, espe-
cially in Southeast Asia.65 In 1992 Indonesia's tropical forests yielded
US $4.2 billion in total revenues, second only to oil and gas in terms of
export earnings.66 In 1991 Malaysia, the largest exporter of tropical
timber in the world, exported more than twenty million cubic meters
a fraction of that felled each year, the rest being either burned to clear land for farming or
used locally").
60. Little Progress Made at Meeting on Managed Logging, Trade in Tropical Timber,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Dec. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied File
[hereinafter Meeting on Managed Logging].
61. Id.
62. Id. In contrast, the World Bank's International Trade Division estimated that in
1987 Japan, the EC, China, and the United States imported 28%, 20.1%, 9.2%, and 7.5%
of all tropical timber exports, respectively. Varangis, supra note 3, at 11.
63. According to another study, the U.N.'s FAO concluded that the removal of tropi-
cal trees for export accounts for "no more than 4 percent" of all tropical trees removed.
JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 10.
64. David Dodwell, Survey of the Earth Summit: Trade Bans Unlikely to Succeed, FIN.
Tizms, June 2, 1992, at V.
65. Shoeb Kagda, Urgent Action Needed to Stop Illegal 77tmber Trade, Bus. Times,
Nov. 21, 1992, at 2. Other countries outside of Southeast Asia with high export shares of
tropical timber are: Congo (62%), Cote d'Ivoire (57%), Gabon (78%), Ghana (49%), and
Liberia (64%). Varangis, supra note 3, at 9-10.
66. Indonesia's Tropical Forests Yield US $4.2 Billion, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File. Approximately 146,000 peo-
pIe in Malaysia (representing about 3% of the Malaysian work force) are employed in
forestry. Malaysia Protests to GATT Over Tropical Timber Labels, AoENCE FRANCE
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of logs, sawnwood, and veneer products worth an estimated US $1.5
billion.67 None of these official figures include revenue derived from
the illegal trade in tropical timber, which is worth an additional US $S
billion worldwide.6'
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION ON THE WORLD TIMBER TRADE
The majority of economists reject projections that the interna-
tional trade in timber, which includes both softwood and hardwood,
will be adversely affected by tropical deforestation. 9 Even if the
tropical forests were to disappear completely, such an event would
have little economic effect on the global timber market for two rea-
sons. First, tropical forests account for less than ten percent of the
global supply of industrial wood.7° While even a ten percent decrease
in the global supply of industrial wood would seem sufficient to in-
crease prices, recent studies suggest that world timber prices will be
more affected by technological progress-wood-saving technology on
the demand side combined with yield-enhancing and "wood-ex-
tending" effects on the supply side-than by tropical deforestation-
induced scarcities of wood. In real terms, world prices for timber are
thus expected to remain stable.71
Second, compounding the problem is that the economic values
placed on hardwood forests in Europe and North America are typi-
cally much higher and arguably more accurate than the stumpage val-
ues placed on tropical forests.72 When compared to temperate and
boreal wood, tropical timber is actually undervalued, since the price of
PREssE [AGEN E FR. PRESSE], Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp File
[hereinafter Malaysia Protests].
67. Kagda, supra note 65, at 2.
68. See Suvendrini Kakuchi, Asia: Illegal Timber Trade Costs Nations Billion-Dollar
Losses, BrNER PREss SERVICE, Dec. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File
(observing that Asian countries are being robbed of billions of dollars due to the illicit
timber trade).
69. Braga, supra note 25, at 177.
70. Id. Industrial roundwood and sawnwood are non-coniferous (non-cone.bearin)
timbers, which means they include temperate as well as tropical woods. Industrial round-
wood consists of logs and pulpwoods. Teak is an example of a highly prized tropical tim-
ber. Varangis, supra note 3, at 8-9.
71. Braga, supra note 25, at 177. But see Rising Lumber Prices Hit Housing Industr,
Nxmmi WEmKL, Feb. 8, 1993, at 9 (observing that "Ithe price of South Sea los has rizan
because tougher cutting and export restrictions have been implemented to protect tropical
rain forests").
72. Jon Liden & Murray Hiebert, Cambodian Assault: Loggers Are Quick To Exploit
the Peace, FARE . ECON. REv., June 4, 1992, at 64.
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tropical logs harvested from these forests does not reflect their true
replacement costs or include the environmental costs associated with
their wholesale destruction.
73
But while tropical deforestation is unlikely to affect significantly
world trade in timber, tropical deforestation likely will have an eco-
nomic effect on the subgroup of tropical timber-exporting states. De-
forestation will result in the loss of an important source of export
revenue.74 In addition, tropical deforestation will increase developing
countries' dependence on foreign timber supplies.7" On the whole,
developing countries are already net importers of forest products such
as pulp and paper from the developed countries in the temperate
zone.76 Moreover, poor forestry management and inefficient timber-
processing practices are predicted to increase the developing world's
dependence on temperate and softwood (coniferous) timber products
in the 1990s.77
V. ECOLOGICAL IMPACT OF TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION
Although tropical deforestation is unlikely to have a measurable
economic impact on the world timber trade, it has a profound impact
on the environment, with severe consequences at the local, regional,
and global levels.
A. Local Effect
Tropical deforestation has a devastating effect on local tropical
plant and animal life, which in turn affects the lives of the indigenous
people who rely on the rain forests' natural ecosystem for their food,
housing, clothing, and medicine.78 In a tropical ecosystem, the
"above-ground" plant and animal growth-from-decomposition cycle is
73. For a detailed economic analysis in which timber scarcity is measured in terms of
the rate of growth of the "stumpage value," see Varangis, supra note 3, at 6.
74. In 1990, tropical timber exports as a percentage of total export revenues were
highest in the following countries: Central African Republic (31%); Myanmar (Burma)
(28%); Cote d'Ivoire (15%); Malaysia (13%); Papua New Guinea (9%); Guinea-Bissau
(9%); Gabon (9%); Cameroon (8%); Indonesia (7%); Liberia (7%); and Ghana (7%). Id.
at 10. One would expect many Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to appear in this list
because such countries lack manufactured exports, which generally have more value than
do raw materials.
75. JOHN sON, supra note 7, at 17.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 19.
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so efficient that soil functions largely as an inert platform. 71 As noted
previously, the soil of a tropical rain forest is largely infertile; conse-
quently, when the rain forest is removed, the underlying soil becomes
incapable of supporting any significant plant life.SO Moreover, when
the rain forests are destroyed, indigenous human groups are forced to
relocate, a "social cost" that is often ignored by the forest inhabitants'
governments who control seventy-five percent of the world's tropical
forests.
In addition to its effect on the indigenous population, rain forest
destruction alters the local climate and weather patterns 1 Because
the absorptive capacity of the area is reduced, drastic changes in pre-
cipitation are direct and immediate.- The result is that rivers that
normally rise and fall during the wet and dry seasons are instead likely
to flood surrounding areas.' Dislodged silt from these floods not
only raises river beds, but also disturbs fishing and agricultural
production.,'
B. Regional Effect
Similarly, tropical deforestation has a host of downstream conse-
quences for the surrounding region. The effect of flooding and silta-
tion on irrigated agriculture, hydroelectric schemes, transport links,
and riverine and coastal fishing, for instance, may be particularly
acute for a tropical country's neighbors.'
Downstream flooding also results in the erosion of fertile top soil,
which in turn leads to regional desertification. In the last twenty
years, for example, farmers worldwide have lost an estimated 480 bil-
lion tons of topsoil, an area roughly equivalent to the amount covering
all of India's cropland.s6
C. Global Effect
Tropical deforestation has a dual negative effect on the global en-
vironment. The first negative consequence is global warming, which
79. Id.
80. hI. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Stewart Hudson, Trade Environment and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EN qONmiEN 55-56 (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
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affects the global commons, the climate; the second negative conse-
quence involves the loss of biological diversity, which affects the level
of plant and animal life within individual sovereigns.8 7 The differing
treatment afforded to the atmosphere and tropical forests under inter-
national law makes the solution of these two separate, but related,
problems infinitely more complex.88
1. Global Warming
Almost all human activity either releases or removes greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere.8 9 These greenhouse gases contribute to
the phenomenon of global warming. For example, conserving tropical
forests removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, but burning
wood for heat and cooking releases it. Given the existing state of sci-
entific knowledge, it is not possible to trace the source of specific car-
bon dioxide emissions because carbon dioxide, like other greenhouse
87. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and The Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 675, 706-7 (1993) (observing that
"developing countries have control over resources that are important to the industrialized
world, just as the industrialized world has always had control over resources needed by the
developing world").
88. For one unrealistic and somewhat radical solution to this problem, see Eshbach,
supra note 11, at 276 (arguing generally that although tropical forests lie within the terri-
tory of individual developing states, they are such an important resource that they should
be treated as part of the global commons and subject to regulation by the developed
world).
89. Greenhouse gases are those gases associated with the "greenhouse effect." The
"greenhouse effect" is defined as the sequence of phenomena comprising the absorption of
solar radiation by the earth, the conversion and re-emission of this radiation, and the sub-
sequent absorption of this radiation by atmospheric water vapor, carbon dioxide, and
ozone, which prevents dissipation of the radiation into space and which results in a gradual
rise in atmospheric temperature. THE AMERCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 578 (William
Morris ed., 1976). Carbon dioxide is the gas primarily associated with the greenhouse ef-
fect. Eshbach, supra note 11, at 276.
This phenomenon is known as the "greenhouse effect" because, when greenhouse
gases are not filtered, they act like "panes of glass, trapping heat near the surface of the
earth." Sharon Begley, Feeling the Heat on the Greenhouse, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 1989, at
80, quoted in Eshbach, supra note 11, at 276. The result is global warming, which is under-
scored by the fact that global temperatures on average have been rising over the past sev-
eral years. Id. at 276. Experts expect this warming trend to continue, with temperatures
rising one to five degrees Celsius by the middle of the next century. Id.
With this predicted global warming trend, summers will be much hotter than typically
expected. As temperatures rise, polar glaciers will melt, resulting in a dramatic swelling of
the sea level. Id. at 277. When this happens, coastal areas will flood, homes will be de-
stroyed, and millions of lives may be lost. Id. In other areas, droughts will become more
common, storms will be more violent, and wind and rainfall patterns will change; such
changes will have a devastating net effect on world agriculture and food production. Id.
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gases, disperses quickly into the global atmosphere. Nevertheless, es-
timates can be made.
The majority of greenhouse emissions come from the developed
North. Industrial activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels for elec-
tricity and transportation, account for about seventy-five percent of
total emissions.90 The United States is undoubtedly the world's larg-
est single contributor to these greenhouse emissions.91
In contrast, the South's precise contribution of greenhouse gases
is in dispute, but by all accounts it is increasing. Current estimates
range from twenty-five percent to about thirty percent of total carbon
dioxide emissions from energy use.92 When the effects of deforesta-
tion are factored in, however, some analysts argue that this proportion
reaches as high as forty percent.93
Tropical deforestation increases the South's contribution of
greenhouse gases because trees, as the primary filters of carbon gases,
remove carbon dioxide from the air, thereby reducing the greenhouse
effect which is causing global warming. Thus, the destruction of for-
ests by burning not only releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere,
but diminishes an important sink for absorbing carbon dioxide created
from other sources. 4
Admittedly, the North emits the majority of greenhouse gases,
yet argues that the developing world's tropical forests must be pre-
served because they function like gigantic "lungs" that assist in filter-
ing out impurities caused by human activity.95 Since the relatively rich
northern countries are unwilling to contribute their fair portion of
funds for conserving this global benefit, the South at least to date has
been largely unwilling or unable to subsidize the North's prolific car-
bon production. As the constructive debate surrounding this issue
breaks down, environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and governments in the developed world exchange accusa-
tions of degradation of the global commons with governments in the
90. JoHNsoN, supra note 7, at 20.
91. Forests for Future Initiative Projects, supra note IS.
92. Interview with Edith Brown Weiss, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univerity Law
Center in Washington, D.C., (Apr. 23, 1993).
93. Id. Some analysts estimate that deforestation may be responsible for up to 209% of
carbon pollution, which is thought to be a major factor behind global warming. Adam
Schwarz, Trade for Trees: Tariff Reform Will Help Save the Forests. FAR E. EcoN. REV.,
June 4, 1992, at 60.
94. Eshbach, supra note 11, at 276.
95. Schwarz, supra note 93, at 60.
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South, who in turn label demands that they subsidize their rich north-
ern neighbors as "eco-imperialist."
2. Loss of Biological Diversity
Tropical forest areas are the most biologically rich on earth.'
6
Although tropical forests cover a mere thirteen percent of the earth's
surface,97 they contain sixty percent of the world's plant species and
most of its animal life.98 But deforestation is currently causing more
species of animals and plants to become extinct than at any other time
since the Cretaceous era, which occurred approximately 135 million
years ago.99 The result is that many species are becoming extinct
before they can even be identified, let alone analyzed. 10°
Aside from their importance as a global "storehouse" of genetic
diversity,10 1 tropical forests also contain many potential "miracle
drugs" that may lead to important discoveries in the fields of cancer
and AIDS research."° The 1992 U.N. Earth Summit, held in Rio de
Janeiro, attempted to capitalize on the growing awareness of tropical
forests as an important source of biological diversity, but, unfortu-
nately, had little success.'0 3
96. Sharon Begley, Research Amid the Camellias, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1989, at 59.
97. Segio Gaete, Environment: Ecologists Accuse IOTW of Promoting Deforestation,
INTER PREss SERVICE, Jan. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File.
98. Begley, supra note 96, at 59; see also Schwarz, supra note 93, at 60.
99. Scientists roughly estimate that species are being destroyed at the rate of 27,000 a
year, which amounts to 74 species per day or 3 species per hour. David Walton, Bountiful
and Endangered, ST. PETERSBURG Tims, Jan. 24, 1993, at 6D.
100. Heffa Schucking & Patrick Anderson, Voices Unheard and Unheeded, in Bi.
ODIVERSrrY: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPEc'ivES 15 (Vandana Shiva et al. eds., 1991).
It is estimated that less than 5% of the rainforest's total plant and animal biological diver-
sity is known to science. Id.
101. Schwarz, supra note 93, at 60.
102. Begley, supra note 96, at 58. For instance, in Amazonia's tropical forests, experi-
ments on several "plants have resulted in two new anti-convulsive drugs, several anesthet-
ics, and an anti-depressant that could be used for treating patients with Parkinson's
Disease." Eshbach, supra note 11, at 277.
103. Convention on Biological Diversity,-June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. The U.S. did not
sign this international agreement. Forests for Future Initiative Projects, supra note 18. In-
stead, President Bush proposed his alternative Forests for the Future Initiative. Id.
For some countries, any efforts to prevent tropical deforestation are too little and too
late. For example, Thailand's tropical forests are now so depleted that it has now been
forced to import timber from surrounding countries like Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia,
and Laos. Schwarz, supra note 93, at 60.
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VI. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE THE
TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE
Because of the severe ecological implications associated with
tropical deforestation, multilateral efforts to regulate the tropical tim-
ber trade are not new. However, in recent years, there has been an
increasing demand to apply the theory of sustainable development 1
to the way in which all forests-primarily those found in the tropics-
are harvested.10 5 The origins of these multilateral efforts can be found
within meetings of the U.N. and the Group of Seven (G-7), but the
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITA) represents the sin-
gle most important multilateral effort to date. Thus, it will be ex-
amined in detail.
A. The International Tropical Timber Agreement
The ITA was the first international commodity agreement that
specifically included provisions for the protection of the environ-
ment."°6 Because the ITA is a unique hybrid agreement-part com-
modity and part international environmental agreement-it is a
worthwhile endeavor to understand something of its purpose and
history.1
0 7
1. Purpose and History
In 1977 the Japanese originally tabled a resolution on timber at
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).1s Although the Japanese imagined a commodity agree-
104. The phrase "sustainable development" refers to the means by %hich development
is made to fulfill "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs." OuR Commo, FtrrunE, supra note 54, at 8.
105. See &g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: State-
ment of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustain-
able Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, AICONF.151(6fRev.1, 31 LL.M.
881, 882 ("[t]hese principles should apply to all types of forests.., in all geographic regions
and climatic zones") [hereinafter Forest Principles].
106. Ursula Wassermann, UNCTAD: International Tropical Timber Agreement, 18 3.
WoR.D TRADE L. 89, 89 (1984).
107. Some argue that the fITA is a trade agreement rather than an international envi-
ronmental treaty. Compare Tropical Tnber Spare that Tree, Eco.o.'.slsr, Nov. 14, 192,
at 40 ("The =A... is a trade agreement....") with 1991 OJ. (C 199) 16 (noting that th2
EC Commission labels the =TIA a unique commodity agreement that specifically incorpa-
rates environmental objectives).
108. Marcus Colchester, The International Tropical Timuber Organization: Kill or Cure
for the Rainforests?, 4 TRANSNAT'L ASS'Ns 226 (1991). Previously, in its resolution 93 (IV)
of May 30, 1976, UNCTAD requested its Secretary-General to convene preparatory meet-
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ment of the sort that governed the international trade in jute and rub-
ber, what resulted was much different."°9 Whereas the jute and
rubber commodity agreements confined themselves strictly to trade
issues, it soon became clear in the negotiations that timber, which is
traded internationally and comes from a variety of sources from dif-
ferent regions of the world's forests, could not be treated as a single,
well-defined commodity.
Although the UNCTAD negotiations were initially intended to
cover both temperate and tropical timber, temperate timber was even-
tually excluded from the negotiations' terms of reference, surprisingly
at the insistence of the developing world."() As a result, the negotia-
tions' emphasis shifted to the international tropical timber trade, and
the negotiations grew in both size and complexity. To the typical host
of civil servants who usually participate in trade negotiations were ad-
ded foresters who could elaborate on the technical aspects of the
industry.
As the negotiations became more narrowly focused, an environ-
mental policy and advocacy group, the International Institute for En-
vironment and Development (IIED), became involved. One author
has succinctly observed that the IIED forcefully argued its case that
any resulting commodity agreement could not limit itself merely to
the technical and commercial aspects of timber extraction and trade,
but also had to provide for the other crucial ecological and genetic
services supplied by forests."' Because of intense pressure imposed
by domestic environmental groups, the industrialized countries, in
particular, could no longer afford to ignore the IIED's arguments. In
late 1983, after six years of multilateral negotiation, the ITTA was fi-
nally signed by the individual members of the International Tropical
Timber Organization (IT-O).
ings for international negotiations on individual commodity products. Register of Interna.
tional Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment, U.N. Environment
Programme, 1989 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 498, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.15/Inf.2. This effort was
known as the "Integrated Programme for Commodities," and the negotiations concerning
tropical timber took place under its aegis. Id.
109. Colchester, supra note 108, at 226.
110. Tropical Forestry Meeting Opens: Environmentalists Urge Stricter Curbs, BNA
INT'L ENv'T DAiLY, Dec. 2,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied File [hereinaf-
ter Tropical Forestry Meeting]. Some tropical timber-exporting countries, such as Indone-
sia, apparently feel that including temperate woods in the ITrA will reduce the importance
of the international trade in tropical timber. Malaysia, Indonesia to Push for Expansion of
Timber Pact, AGENcE FR. PimssE, Dec. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp
File.
111. Colchester, supra note 108, at 226-7.
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But before any commodity agreement with environmental provi-
sions could be signed, another point of dispute had to be settled. The
national governments participating in the negotiations were primarily
concerned with how power under the new international agreement
would be divided. The resulting voting system clearly reveals where
the parties think the relevant trade and environmental priorities are
located.
Under the ITA's complicated formula, votes are divided equally
between consumers in the developed world and exporters of tropical
wood in the developing world." 2 Consumer states are then appor-
tioned a certain number of votes based on their consumption of tropi-
cal timber, which apparently also determines the size of their funding
obligations.113 Japan, which imports roughly sixty percent of its tim-
ber requirements, has the most votes of any consumer country be-
cause it is the largest importer of tropical timber. In comparison to
Japan's high consumption rate of 45.7 percent of total tropical timber
exports, the respective consumption rates of the United States (9.7
percent), South Korea (7.9 percent), and France (6.4 percent) seem
insignificant."14 These countries thus have a limited ability to influ-
ence ITTA policy via voting.
Similarly, producers of tropical timber receive weighted votes
based on the amount of timber they export.115 On the producer side,
this means that Malaysia, which exports 42.1 percent of all tropical
timber, has the most votes, followed by Indonesia (exporting 19.5 per-
cent of all tropical timber), and the Philippines (exporting 8.2 percent
of all tropical timber)." 6 By way of contrast, a country's actual area
of tropical forests is given only secondary importance.
The net result of this weighted voting system is that "the more a
country contributes to the destruction of tropical forests, the more votes
with which it is rewarded "" 7 The ITTA's voting structure thereby en-
sures that the goal of promoting the international trade in tropical
timber outweighs its secondary conservation role. Viewed from this
perspective, the ITO-created voting system can be seen as a serious
112. As noted in subpart H(C), the number of net tropical timbcr-exporters is exp-ted
to fall dramatically during the 1990s, from thirty-three to less than ten by the end of this
century. In the coming years it will be interesting to see what impact, if any, dcchinin-
exports will have on the =TA's existing voting structure.
113. Colchester, supra note 10S, at 227.
114. Tropical Forestry Meeting, supra note 110.
115. Colchester, supra note 108, at 227.
116. Tropical Forestry Meeting, supra note 110.
117. Colchester, supra note 108, at 227.
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structural impediment to promoting sustainable timber harvesting at
the multilateral level.
2. Structure and Function
The ITrA is governed by the International Tropical Timber
Council (ITTC). The ITTC consists of fifty states, including twenty-
three timber-producing countries 18 and twenty-seven timber-consum-
ing countries. 119 In the ITrA articles, the ITTC was delegated the
contradictory duties of "promoting the trade in tropical timber," while
simultaneously "encouraging the sustainable use and conservation of
tropical forests and their genetic resources, and of maintaining [their]
ecological balance."' 20 As noted above, the ITrA's voting structure
ensures that the ITTC's former goal will almost always trump the lat-
ter one.
Even though the ITTA was signed in November 1983, it did not
enter into force until April 1, 1985.121 During this two and a half year
waiting period, a second battle erupted concerning where the ITTC's
secretariat position would be located and who would be its executive
director. In the resulting compromise, it was decided that the ITTC
secretariat would be located in Yokohama, Japan and that the execu-
tive director post would go to a Malaysian.'22 Given the voting ar-
rangements, this result is hardly surprising.
With its structural and functional roles finally resolved, in 1986
the ITTC finally began getting down to its work of promoting the sus-
tainable logging of tropical timber. In the ensuing years, the ITTC
met periodically in a series of meetings, similar to "rounds" within the
GATT.
118. According to the 1TIC, its twenty-three producing member states, which are lo-
cated in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, together control 80% of the world's tropical
forest area. Tropical Forestry Meeting, supra note 110.
119. Expansion of imber Agreement May Be Unwieldy: ITTO Chief, AOENCn FR.
PR.nssE, Dec. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp File. The twenty-seven con-
suming countries of the ITTC, located in North America, Europe, Asia, and Oceania, ac-
count for more than 95% of the global trade in tropical timber products. Tropical Forestry
Meeting, supra note 110.
120. Colchester, supra note 108, at 227.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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3. 1990 Bali Meeting and Target 2000
During its 1990 annual meeting in Bali, the ITIC announced
"Target 2000,"1 the year by which all tropical timber is to be derived
from sustainable logging practices. 124 The problem is that there is no
single definition of what constitutes sustainable logging of tropical
timber."2 So-called "deep" ecologists argue that there is no such
thing as sustainable timber extraction, while tropical exporting coun-
tries counter that they are already practicing sustainable logging. 126
To date, the ITrC has not agreed on any single definition of what
constitutes "sustainable management and use of tropical
rainforests."'2 7 The absence of a working definition of sustainable
logging further contributes to the 1IT1C's perceived weakness.
4. 1993 Quito Meeting
In January 1993, the 1TTC met in Quito, Ecuador to define and
coordinate programs for the sustainable use of tropical forests and to
discuss renegotiation of the 1TTA, which will expire in March of
1994.128
More significantly, a group of tropical timber-exporting countries,
led by Malaysia and Indonesia, also proposed amending the ITTA in
order to expand its mandate to all of the world's forests, not just those
located in the tropics.129 The proposal was summarily rejected by the
IITC's consumer nations, led by the United States and Canada. As
one delegate put it, the tropical timber-importing countries "are only
interested in buying tropical woods at low prices and are not willing to
include their temperate woods in the agreements."120
123. Tropical Forestry Meeting, supra note 110.
124. German Wood Manufacturers, supra note 53.
125. Netherlands: Dutch in Malaysian Rain Forest Study, FINANCIEELE DAGoLAV, Oct.
17, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
126. See e.g., Malaysia Protests, supra note 66 (noting that Malaysia denies allegations
of indiscriminate logging, countering that it practices sustainable forest management).
127. Meeting on Managed Logging, supra note 60. According to one estimate, only 1%
of tropical forests are managed sustainably today. See Tropical Timbcr; Spare That Trce,
supra note 107, at 40.
128. Gaete, supra note 97.
129. ML; see also Bronwen Maddox, Catch-all Forestry Rules Urged, FizN. Tr .ic:, Jan. 27,
1993, at 28.
130. Gaete, supra note 97.
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B. Criticism of the ITTC Levied by Non-Governmental
Organizations
NGOs initially favored the ITrA because they thought it would
lead shortly to sustainable harvesting of tropical timber. However,
NGOs have grown frustrated as the years pass and the world's forests
continue to be destroyed.131 In particular, they charge that the ITTC
can never be truly effective so long as Japan controls its annual budget
and has the greatest total number (thirty-three percent) of ITTC
votes.
132
NGOs also feel that the ITTC's deliberations, like those of the
GATT panels, must become more transparent and less secretive.
These NGOs, however, fail to remain cognizant of one important fact:
Multilateral negotiation is typically slow, but usually fairer than uni-
lateral action.
C. Multilateralism or Unilateralism?
Multilateral negotiations involve attempts to build a global or re-
gional consensus on issues that adversely impact one or more of the
participating countries' interests. The rate of progress is often tortu-
ous at best, and nowhere is this fact more evident than in disputes
between the North and South. Global warming and tropical defores-
tation have been particularly thorny issues with which the interna-
tional community continues to grapple.
Within this context fits the snail-like progress made between trop-
ical timber importers and exporters. This slow, albeit steady, progress
wears upon the patience of all parties involved, as can easily be
imagined. But while international consensus-building is admittedly a
cumbersome and inefficient process, it is equally true that it is far
more democratic than the unilateral imposition of trade sanctions ac-
ceptable to the stronger of the two negotiating parties, which in this
particular dispute would be the industrialized North.
As the Austrian example in the next section will illustrate, a
growing number of tropical timber-importing states in the developed
world have grown frustrated by the slow rate of progress in achieving
global consensus on the environment. Because developed countries
are more economically powerful and in a superior position to impose
131. New International Group Will Conduct Scientific Rain Forest Research, BNA INT'L
ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied File.
132. In fiscal 1992, for example, Japan contributed more than US $10 million, or 35% of
the ITO's operating budget. Meeting on Managed Logging, supra note 60.
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their will upon the world trading community, they have argued that
they should decide unilaterally what constitutes sustainable use of for-
est resources located outside of their own territories. These countries
feel-perhaps justifiably so-that there will be little, if any, tropical
forest left in the world by the time the international community
reaches a consensus on the specific actions to be taken to prevent con-
tinued deforestation from occurring.
With the GATT in mind, it is also important to point out that
valid environmental policy interests must be ever vigilant against cap-
ture by domestic protectionist sentiment, which leads to unjustifiable
discrimination against developing countries. 1-3 To allow protectionist
sentiment to dominate leads to valid environmental concerns being
frustrated, detrimental trade wars erupting, and well-supported cries
of "eco-imperialism" being invoked by Third World nations, who
merely seek to improve the living standards of their burgeoning popu-
lations via development programs already utilized in the developed
world.134
Like all deforestation, tropical deforestation is a serious problem,
but "might does not make right" and this problem could best be re-
solved at the international level, either under the auspices of the
United Nations or within the framework of the U.N.-affilated confer-
ence of timber-trading nations, the ITTO. 135
In fact, unilateral restrictions on the importation of tropical tim-
ber products actually have an adverse effect on global trade liberaliza-
tion efforts without solving the problem of global warming. Instead,
unilateral efforts by countries such as Austria are illegal under the
GATI" because they constitute a form of arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination-singling out the relatively minor role tropical defores-
tation plays in the larger problem of global warming. On the other
hand, the most significant cause of global warming-the burning of
non-renewable fossil fuels in the developed world-is ignored pre-
cisely by those who should be held most responsible.
Against this backdrop, Austria's recent attempt to restrict the in-
ternational trade in tropical timber products is worth scrutinizing, as it
represents the most recent example of what undoubtedly will be a
133. See Environment Concerns Must Not Be Kidnapped by Protectionists, Sa3s Arthur
Dunkel, GATI PRass CoNIamQut RET EAS E DE PXSSE: (GAT11530). Feb. 11, 19?2.
134. The majority of the world's population lives in the developing %orld; thus. the
pressure to industrialize is unlikely to ebb anytime soon.
135. Certification System Would Classify Tropical-Tunber Goods, Nu:Et NVEEmLV,
Dec. 28, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Certification System].
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growing trend in dealing with the multilateral problem on a unilateral
basis. The Austrian experience represents the latest, but by no means
the last, example of a developed country that tried to "do the right
thing," but in the wrong way. The following proverb with a modern
day twist could be said to apply: The road to sustainable development
is littered with good intentions-good intentions that are contrary to
GATT, as well as environmentally counterproductive.
VII. THE AUSTRIAN CASE: A
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EXERCISE IN
UNILATERALISM
In early 1993, commenting on Austria's confrontation with the
member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 36 the Economist magazine observed that the next hot in-
ternational business issue would likely concern the "trade in tropical
timber. ' 137 With the regularity of the vernal equinox, unilateral re-
strictions on tropical timber imports will continue to appear on the
world's political landscape during the 1990s.
A. Origins of the Dispute
The dispute originally broke out in June 1992 when Austria's Par-
liament introduced new legislation concerning tropical timber im-
ports.138  Like other countries in the developed world considering
similar restrictions, Austria's purported purpose in enacting this legis-
lation was to promote the sustainable use of tropical forests located in
the developing world.139 The new legislation was also the result of
domestic pressure from environmental groups concerned with tropical
deforestation's contribution to global warming. 140 Significantly, the
Austrian Parliament placed no corresponding sustainability restric-
tions on temperate timber extraction methods nor on the burning of
136. The contracting parties of ASEAN include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN Criticizes Austrian Labelling Measures on Tropical Tim-
ber, 95 GATT Focus NEWSLETrER (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva,
Switz.), Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 4 [hereinafter ASEAN Criticizes Austrian Labelling Measures].
137. Trade in Tropical Timber: For the Chop, EcoNoMisTr, Jan. 30, 1993, at 61 [hereinaf-
ter Trade in Tropical Timber].
138. ASEAN Urged to Take Common Stand on Ecolabelling, STRArrs TIMES (Malay-
sia), Oct. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Strait File.
139. Austria's purpose is "purported" because of potential "de facto" discrimination
against tropical timber importers. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1227, 1236-37 (1992).
140. ASEAN Criticizes Austrian Labelling Measures, supra note 136, at 2.
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fossil fuels, which is the most important source of global warming
gases.
B. Austria's Restrictions on Tropical Timber
The Austrian legislation as initially proposed consisted of two
parts: an import tax and a mandatory labeling law. Both parts con-
templated extraterritorial enforcement and were to go into effect on
September 1, 1992.11
1. The Import Tax
Under the first prong of Austria's rain forest legislation, the Eco-
nomic Affairs Ministry was to increase the import tax on all products
made from or containing tropical wood from eight percent to a whop-
ping seventy percent.1 42 The revenue from this "eco-tariff," estimated
at US $18.2 million,'43 would then be donated to international envi-
ronmental projects that promote sustainable harvesting of tropical
forests. 44 As noted previously, there is to date no international con-
sensus concerning what constitutes sustainable logging. While this
fact is not dispositive, it does make any unilateral decision on what
constitutes sustainable use of tropical forests somewhat arbitrary, es-
pecially given that the decision is imposed on others by a government
that does not have any such forests located within its own jurisdiction.
2. The Mandatory Labeling Law
The second, slightly less polemical prong of the Austrian legisla-
tion concerned a selective import certification system combined with a
mandatory labeling law.'4 Under the so-called "eco-labeling" law,
the first law of its kind, the Austrian Parliament mandated that all
tropical wood imports be labeled with tags reading "Made from Tropi-
cal Wood" or "Contains Tropical Wood."'14 6 Similarly, the import cer-
141. Id.
142. Austrian Industry, Malaysians Angered Over Tropical Wood Labeling Requirement,
BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Nov. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaiad File
[hereinafter Austrian Industry].
143. Michael Lindemann, Parliament Votes to Scrap World-First Tropical Wod Tawcs,
UPI, Dec. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
144. International Trade, Reilly Says GATT Needs "Greening" After End of Utzquay
Round Negotiations, BNA DAmLy REP. FOR ExEcmtrrrVs, Nov. 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Drexec File.
145. Austria is the first country ever to introduce a so-called "eco-lablling" lav con-
cerning tropical timber. Austrian Industry, supra note 142.
146. Lindemann, supra note 143.
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tification system was to distinguish between products made from
tropical timber that was harvested in a sustainable fashion and that
which was not.147 Under the legislation, the Austrian authorities were
to determine which forestry practices constituted sustainable logging
and to decide which tropical timber-exporting countries complied with
their definition of sustainable logging practices.148
C. The ASEAN Response
Charging unfair discrimination and citing eco-labeling as a non-
tariff barrier (NTB) to trade, ASEAN's member states quickly
mounted their own aggressive counter-campaign of "objective infor-
mation" on tropical timber extraction. 49 Malaysia, in particular,
feared that it was only a matter of time before other EC members
would be prompted by domestic ecological movements to enact simi-
lar legislation. Thus, Malaysia quickly asked its neighbors to join it in
retaliating "tit for tat" with trade sanctions against Austrian imports
to Southeast Asia.'50
In tandem with this threat of retaliation, Malaysian officials also
lodged a formal protest with the GATT's Committee on Technical
Barriers to Trade, alleging unfair discrimination.1 ' In its protest, the
Malaysian government charged that Austria was attempting to decide
unilaterally what constituted "sustainably managed forests when there
is still no international consensus.' '1- 2 Moreover, Malaysia was quick
to point out that Austria could have an ulterior motive for placing
147. Timber logged by sustainable forest management techniques is to be rewarded
with an additional certification that states: "This timber was cut from an area of the forest
where limited logging does not invite deforestation." Certification System, supra note 135,
at 3.
148. ASEAN Criticizes Austrian Labelling Measures, supra note 136, at 2.
149. ASEAN to Combat West's Anti-Tropical Wood Policy, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Oct.
12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp File. Even in the aftermath of the Austro-
ASEAN dispute, Malaysia has continued to lead the counterattack against the anti-tropical
timber campaign in the industrialized countries. Malaysia Steps Up Counter Campaign, in
MoRI No KoE I, supra note 12, at 7. In December 1991 Malaysian Primary Industries
Minister Dr. Lim Keng Yaik announced that the Malaysian government would allocate
approximately ten million Malaysian dollars (approximately US $4 million) towards these
efforts. Id.
150. Malaysia Threatens Trade Ban on Austria Over Wood Products, UPI, Oct. 27, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
151. Malaysia Protests, supra note 66. At the GATT, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Mexico, Paki-
stan, Peru, and South Korea all said they shared the ASEAN concerns. ASEAN Criticizes
Austrian Labelling Measures, supra note 136, at 2. The European Community, in contrast,
stressed that "eco-labeling" requirements are not per se GATI prohibited. Id.
152. Malaysia Protests, supra note 66.
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unilateral restrictions on the international trade in tropical timber,
since it produces twelve million cubic meters of temperate timber
products annually.153 Hence, while Austria's regulations appeared
"on their face" to be non-discriminatory, in practice they represented
a form of "de facto" discrimination because they did not apply to the
"like temperate timber products" of foreign or domestic producers. s4
An analysis of the Austrian furniture industry underscored this claim
of discrimination.
55
An official in the Austrian Environmental Ministry denied dis-
criminatory intent, countering that the Austrian import restrictions
did not "apply to Malaysia or Indonesia only but to every country,
including Austria."' 6 This comment is somewhat disingenuous given
that Austria, unlike Malaysia and Indonesia, does not have any tropi-
cal forests. 7 Still, Austria's response to Malaysia's accusations raises
a troublesome -wrinkle in the GATT, which recognizes some import
restrictions designed to preserve animal and plant life provided that
they are non-discriminatory. In some sense, a rain forest-free country
such as Austria will always discriminate against those tropical coun-
tries that do possess rain forests. This will make it difficult to meet the
GATT's General Exceptions requirements of article XX.' s This issue
will be discussed at greater length in Section IX.
153. I&
154. Jackson, supra note 139, at 1236-37.
155. The furniture industry provides an example of what Professor John H. Jackson has
termed "de jure" discrimination, since 90% of the furniture imported into Austria is made
from temperate rather than tropical wood. EC Eco-Label Program Raises Concerns for
Brazilian Business, Government Officials, BNA INTL EX"T DAILY, Feb. 3, 1993, aradable
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied File [hereinafter EC Eco-Label Program]. Although
Austria has chosen to allow only tropical wood imports derived from sustainable forestry
practices, the majority of the temperate wood products that it imports are not harvested in
a sustainable manner. Id. Nevertheless, no similar import restrictions apply to temperate
wood furniture, making Austria's actions inconsistent as well as discriminatory. Id
156. Austrian Industry, supra note 142.
157. The Austrian official's comment from the Environmental Ministry serems all the
more absurd as even the ministry of Economic Affairs conceded that its import tan: %ould
result in economic losses for the tropical timber exporting countries. Id.
158. Under the General Exceptions to the GAIT, article XX(g) requires that any mea-
sure adopted by a contracting party must be "made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption." The problem is, however, %,hat should the
GATI's reaction be when there is no corresponding domestic production of tropical tim-
ber products or consumption to restrict? For a more detailed discussion of this thorny
issue, see Steve Chamovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATTArficle X,
25 J. WoRLD TAD.E, 37, 51 (1991).
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D. Repeal of the Import Tax
While Austria's import tax was very popular domestically 59 and
encouraged similar "innovative" initiatives in the United States,
Belgium, and the European Parliament, it was almost certain that if
such a "penal tariff" was ever challenged, the tariff would be rejected
in the GATT. 160 The GATT implications of such measures will be
examined in subpart IX(A), but apparently the Austrian Parliament
concluded that its own actions were unnecessary and a form of unjus-
tifiable discrimination, for it shortly decided to scrap the import tax
measure in early December 1992.161 A cabinet level minister in the
Austrian government conceded that while "Austria can play a role in
multilateral negotiations ... [,] it cannot be the only actor." 162
A Greenpeace environmentalist, in a blast of angry rhetoric, re-
torted that the Austrian government's actions were nothing more than
a "cowardly climbdown in the face of threats of a few elitist govern-
ment representatives from Southeast Asia who have no mandate from
the affected populations.' 1 63 Austrian companies, on the other hand,
were generally supportive of the move, since they feared retaliatory
trade measures would be imposed on them by ASEAN member
states.' 64
E. The Austro-Malaysian Compromise
It remains unknown what the GATT's formal response to the
Austro-ASEAN tropical timber complaint would have been because
the controversy was defused in December 1992. In return for Aus-
159. Eighty Austrian mayors supported the higher import tax on tropical timber, and
ten thousand people wrote to express their support for the tax measure. Lindemann, supra
note 143.
160. Trade in Tropical 7mber, supra note 137, at 61.
161. Lindemann, supra note 143.
162. Parliament Rescinds Tropical Wood Tax, Maintains Product Eco-Label Require-
ment, BNA INr'L ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bnaied
File (quoting Austrian Economic Affairs Minister Wolfgang Schuessel) [hereinafter Parlia-
ment Rescinds Tropical Wood Tax].
163. Lindemann, supra note 143. The decision to rescind the June resolution was also
criticized by the Greens, the Liberal Party, and various other political parties in Austria.
Parliament Rescinds Tropical Wood Tax, supra note 162.
164. Austrian Industry, supra note 142. In 1991, Austrian exports to Malaysia were
worth US $84.6 million, and Malaysian imports to Austria were valued at US $93 million,
Lindemann, supra note 143. Austria's Economic Affairs Minister, Wolfgang Schuessel,
also worried that contracts worth an estimated US $1.8 billion over the next few years
would be placed in jeopardy if sanctions were imposed. Parliament Rescinds Tropical
Wood Tax, supra note 162.
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tria's rescinding the import tax, Malaysia agreed to withdraw its com-
plaint before the GATT. Tensions were further reduced, and Austria
promised to form a joint committee to study the import-certification
initiative in greater detail. During the interim, the "eco-labeling" law
on tropical wood products remains in effect. 165
The debate surrounding tropical timber and trade does not end
with the cessation of hostilities between Austria and Malaysia, how-
ever, since the United States, Japan, and other Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are calling
for additional limits or bans on tropical timber from countries that are
deemed to have unsustainable forest policies.16 6 The GATT legality
of these proposed measures is thus worth examining.
VIII. THE LEGALITY OF VARIOUS UNILATERAL
MEASURES DESIGNED TO RESTRICT THE
INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE
Unilateral attempts to restrict the international tropical timber
trade come from tropical timber-exporting states in the South as well
as tropical timber-importing states in the North. The particular trade
restrictions take many forms that impose light or heavy burdens on
global trade. In order to analyze their legality under the GATT, these
unilateral efforts to restrict the international tropical timber trade will
be grouped into three categories: (1) export bans and quantitative re-
strictions; (2) import bans, boycotts, and tariffs; and (3) eco-labeling
and certification programs.
A. Export Bans and Quantitative Restrictions
On the timber-exporting side, unilateral restrictions to restrict the
international tropical timber trade include export bans and quantita-
tive restrictions, which are sometimes referred to as "quotas." Pro-
ducing states also frequently impose customs duties and export taxes.
A primary purpose of such policies is to stimulate value-added
processing at the local level, thereby increasing foreign exchange
earnings, while simultaneously reducing the log content of timber
product exports. 167 It is also believed that limiting or banning the ex-
165. Parliament Rescinds Tropical Wood Tax, supra note 162.
166. The Netherlands are preparing to introduce their own import certification pro-
grams for tropical timber. Germany is studying import certification programs. Certifica-
tion System, supra note 135, at 3.
167. Varangis, supra note 3, at 12.
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port of unprocessed or semiprocessed logs will buttress conservation
policies, but this claim is of dubious merit.16 Notable examples where
such restrictive policies have been employed include most Latin
America countries, the state of British Columbia in Canada, the state
of Washington in the United States, and most Southeast Asian coun-
tries, including Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Malay-
sia, Thailand, and Cambodia.16
9
Despite these purposes, the export bans and quantitative restric-
tions on tropical timber trade that are imposed by tropical timber-
exporting states are unlikely to be found consistent with the states'
obligations under GAT' articles III:1 and XI:1. 170
Article III:1 precludes "internal quantitative regulations" from
being applied to domestic products "so as to afford protection to do-
mestic industry.' 171 Quantitative restrictions on international tropical
timber trade do not comply with the provisions of article III because
tropical timber-exporting states do not place corresponding limita-
tions on domestic consumption of their forests, which means that ex-
port restrictions favor domestic processing of tropical timber
products. 72 Similarly, export bans violate the terms of article XI:1,
which provides that contracting parties shall not institute or maintain
prohibitions on the exportation of any product destined for the terri-
tory of any other member. 73 Because export bans and quantitative
restrictions are otherwise prohibited by the GATT, tropical timber-
exporting countries may only justify the use of such restrictions if they
satisfy one of the general exceptions to GATT article XX.174
According to article XX(g) of the GATT, export bans or quanti-
tative restrictions can be introduced to conserve natural resources
only if domestic consumption of the resource is simultaneously re-
duced. 75 The theory behind this requirement is that only a con-
tracting party prepared to make its own economic sacrifices may
168. Similar bans on the export of unprocessed logs have been imposed by many states
in the Pacific Northwest. Id.
169. Id.
170. GAIT, supra note 4, arts. I11:1, XI:A, 55 U.N.T.S at 204, 224.
171. Id. art. II:1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204.
172. Jeffrey R. Vincent, The Tropical Timber Trade and Sustainable Development, Sci.
ENCE, June 19, 1992, at 1654.
173. GA1T, supra note 4, art. XI:1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
174. Id. art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
175. Similarly, a GATT article XX(b) measure would not be "necessary" to protect
plant life unless domestic restrictions corresponding to those on exports were imposed.
For a discussion of "necessary," see infra subpart VIII(B).
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restrict the exploitation of its natural resources in the world market .1 7 6
Such a constraint is readily understandable from the perspective of a
disciple of free trade, but not as quickly from the standpoint of an
ecologist.
Ecologists would support export restrictions if they thought that
total consumption of the resource would decline as a result. The
problem is that in the context of tropical forests, trade restraints of
this sort are environmentally counterproductive because they actually
encourage increased consumption patterns.
To elaborate, economists have in recent years disputed the effi-
cacy of increasing value-added processing by limiting or banning tim-
ber exports. They question whether the benefits of such policies are
great enough to offset the costs involved. Studies conducted in Ma-
laysia and Indonesia during the 1980s, for example, indicate that the
costs of export restrictions have exceeded the associated benefits.'
The various studies all cite the systematic undervaluation of raw or
unprocessed logs in reaching this conclusion, since log export bans
have the effect of depressing domestic log prices when compared with
international prices. 17S The relatively lower level of local prices has a
twofold effect. First, it encourages the wasteful use of logs in local
processing 179 and, second, it further contributes to the already high
rate of domestic consumption. 160 The net result of these export re-
strictions is greater exploitation of the tropical forests.
Compounding the problem of export restrictions on tropical tim-
ber is recent GATT-panel practice. In the U.S.-Canada Herring and
Salmon dispute, for example, a GAIT panel examined an analogous
export restriction, finding that it was prohibited.8 1 The panel empha-
176. Margareta E. Kulessa, Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, Is the GATT
in Need of Reform?, 27 IympancoNo.sics 165, 171 (1992).
177. See Vincent, supra note 172, at 1651; Kenji Takeuchi, Trade Policy for Rcsource
Based Industrialization: Costs and Benefits of Indonesia's Log Export Ban 2-3. 12, 13 JIn-
ternational Trade Division, World Bank, 1991, unpublished working paper, on file % ith
author).
178. Varangis, supra note 3, at 14; see also Vinrcent, supra note 172, at 1654.
179. LTis F. CONSTANTINO, ON THE EFFcIENcy OF INDONESIA'S S. Iart- A4D
PLYMILLING INDusriuns, Ministry of Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organzation of the
United Nations, Indonesia, UTF/INSI065IINS: Forestry Studies Field Document No. IV-5,
Jakarta, Jan. 1990, at 45.
180. Varangis, supra note 3, at 14. For a discussion of the effect of domestic consur p-
tion's contribution to tropical deforestation, see supra Part IIl.
181. Canada. Measures Affecting Erports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Report
of the Panel, GAIT Doc. I16268 (Mar. 22, 19SS); see also Ted L. MeDorman, Intcrnational
Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dis-
pute, 7 J. IW-L' ARB. 107 (Dec. 1990).
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sized that as required by article XX(g), Canada's export ban did not
limit the access of domestic processors and consumers of salmon and
herring supplies at all, but rather only limited the access of foreign
processors and consumers.182 As mentioned above, tropical timber-
exporting states do not place corresponding restrictions on domestic
consumption of their forests, making their export restrictions on tropi-
cal timber very difficult to distinguish from this case.
The most likely reason that Indonesia's and Malaysia's export
bans and quantitative restrictions on timber logs have not been chal-
lenged in the GATT to date is that the GATT member states of the
developed world are more willing to provide these lesser developed
countries some leeway in fulfilling their GATT obligations than the
developed member states are willing to provide to each other.18 3 This
permissive attitude may soon change though, given the escalating rate
of tropical deforestation.
B. Import Bans, Boycotts, and Tariffs
On the timber-importing side, unilateral restrictions appear in a
panoply of forms, which include import bans, quantitative restrictions,
qualified bans, eco-tariffs, and import taxes. Austria's import tax rep-
resents the most prominent example falling within this category, but
as already noted, it is by no means the only case.
In recent years, a proliferation of sub-national attempts to restrict
tropical timber imports has occurred. For example, about two hun-
dred city councils in Germany and fifty-one percent of Dutch munici-
palities have banned the use of tropical timber.184 In the United
States, numerous cities s5 and at least four states-Arizona, Califor-
182. OTA, supra note 36, at 85. In 1988, Canada advised the U.S. that it would accept
the adoption of the Panel's report by the GATI' Council as well as remove its export
restriction. Id.
183. See GAIT, supra note 4, art. XVIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276; Part IV, Protocol Amend-
ing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and
development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, 572 U.N.T.S. 320 (entered into force June 27,
1966).
184. NELS JOHNSON & BRUCE CABARLE, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITrrTE, SURVIVINO
THE Cur. NATURAL FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE HuMID TROPICs 3 (Final Draft pre-
pared for the Feb. 23, 1993 meeting of the Advisory Panel of the project on the "National
Economic Implications of a Transition to Sustainable Agriculture in the United States," on
file with author).
185. See, e.g., R. Daniel Foster, Thumbs Up for a Wooden Performance, L.A. Tirms,
Feb. 11, 1993, at J1 (observing that "[r]ecently, Santa Monica and Los Angeles enacted
laws severely limiting the purchase of tropical hardwoods within their borders").
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nia, New York, and Minnesota-have banned the use of all tropical
timber products in public construction projects. 5 6
Import bans and boycotts, at least as currently contemplated, 107
are almost certainly illegal under the GATr.1s This conclusion is
based on three arguments, all of which were present in the Austrian
example previously discussed in Part VII. First, import bans and boy-
cotts are prohibited by the GATT because, on their face, they discrim-
inate between tropical and non-tropical timber.1S9 This discrimination
is evident when tropical timber's treatment is compared with that re-
ceived by either imports or domestic supplies of temperate timber. In
Austria's case, this discrimination against tropical timber products
came from both foreign and domestic sources.
If, on the one hand, a GATT-contracting party with tropical tim-
ber restrictions imports non-tropical timber, either temperate or bo-
real, then that party is in violation of the GATT's most-favored-nation
(MFN) requirement that appears in article I.190 Article I requires that
MFN status be afforded to all "like" products in the international
stream of trade.191 Therefore, because tropical and non-tropical tim-
ber are considered to be "like" products in a number of different in-
dustries worldwide, the GATT prohibits a country from imposing
import restrictions on the one without the other being regulated as
well.192
186. Varangis, supra note 3, at 15-16. The effect of sub-national regulation on the I orld
trading system raises fascinating questions that are only just being considered. Unfortu-
nately, these questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
187. The author knows of no current unilateral restrictions---on the import or extort
side-that apply equally to temperate, tropical, and boreal timber products.
188. The GATr Secretariat has already determined that unilateral import restrictions
on the tropical timber trade represent one "unconvincing case" for trade restraints on envi-
ronmental grounds. GATT SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRO.NMENr 28 (1942); see
also Expanding Trade Can Help Solve Environmental Problems, Says Report, B3 GATr
Focus NEwsLairER (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, Swvitz.), Mar. 4,
1992, at 4 (noting that there are GATT constraints when "there is concern about produc-
tion or consumption activities in another country").
189. Some proponents of unilateral restrictions on tropical timber have attempted to
justify the differing treatment received by non-tropical and tropical woods on the ground
that unlike temperate forests tropical forests "probably do not reforest fully naturally."
Walgren, supra note 6, at E3534. The GATT would consider this argument unconvincing
when tropical and non-tropical woods directly compete within a given market as "like
products."
190. GATT, supra note 4, art. I, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
191. Id.
192. Temperate softwood and tropical hardwood logs directly compete in the plywood,
construction, and furniture industries. MoRi No KoE I, supra note 12, at 1.
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If, on the other hand, a GATT-contracting party decides to im-
pose a law that affects the "offering for sale" of tropical timber prod-
ucts, then that restriction cannot be applied "so as to afford protection
to domestic production" of "like domestic products."19 3 Otherwise,
the law is prohibited under article III of the GATT, which imposes a
national treatment obligation (NTO) on all its members. This means
that a country that harvests or manufactures timber products from do-
mestic sources will be in violation of its GATT obligations to the ex-
tent that it is unjustifiably discriminating against any "like" tropical
timber imports.
Second, import restrictions on tropical timber are largely
processed-based, and processed-based distinctions for environmental
purposes have already been determined to be prohibited under the
GATT.194 More specifically, the legal basis for a developed country
imposing import bans on products from a developing country based
on differences in environmental standards has already been chal-
lenged successfully under the GATT. The GAIT 1991 panel decision
invalidating the U.S. ban on imports of Mexican tuna has established a
difficult-to-distinguish precedent in the tropical forest context. 195
Third, import bans, boycotts, and eco-tariffs are prohibited under
the GATT because they are not "necessary" as that term is used in
article XX(b). The relevant inquiry therefore, as framed by recent
GATT panels, is whether a measure is "necessary to protect human,
animal, plant life or health." A measure is unnecessary if an alterna-
tive, consistent with the GATT, is available. 96 One GATT panel re-
cently went so far as to hold that any contracting party wishing to
invoke an article XX exception must first exhaust all other reasonably
available consistent alternatives before it can resort to a measure in-
consistent with the GAIT. 19 In the Mexican Tuna-Dolphin context,
this meant that the U.S. could not justify its unilateral restrictions on
193. GATT, supra note 4, art. III, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204.
194. 1 GATT INT'L TRADE 1990-91 23 (1992).
195. Kulessa, supra note 176, at 170; see also infra notes 198,208-212 and accompanying
text.
196. Charnovitz, supra note 158, at 48-49 (quoting Thailand-Restrictions on Importa-
tion of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. No. DS10IR (Nov. 7, 1990) 1 74); see
also 1 GATT INT'L TRADE 1990-91, supra note 194, at 23 n.30.
197. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GAIT Doc.
No. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), at 46 [hereinafter Mexican Tuna-Dolphin Report].
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the incidental killing of dolphins because it did not first attempt multi-
lateral negotiation.19S
Assuming, arguendo, that the GATr was reformed to allow im-
port bans and boycotts, these measures should still not be utilized
against tropical timber products, because notwithstanding the GATr
they are still environmentally counterproductive. First, import bans
and boycotts further depress the already undervalued tropical forests,
making them less competitive against alternative uses such as agricul-
ture and ranching.' 99 Second, developed countries' import bans and
boycotts influence at most a small fraction of the world's total tropical
timber production.2 As mentioned previously, eighty percent or
more of all tropical timber production is consumed either domestically
or in other developing countries.201 Finally, import bans and boycotts
fail to address the primary causes of deforestation, which include pov-
erty, rapid population growth, and clearance for agriculture and cattle
ranching purposes.
C. Eco-Labeling and Certification Programs
Austria's mandatory labeling law is currently the most visible one
on the international trade landscape, but it is by no means unique.
Numerous public and private parties in tropical timber-importing
countries are contemplating similar programs, making this topic a
worthwhile recipient of further study.202
Eco-labeling laws and their associated certification programs usu-
ally concern differences in production and process methods (PPMs)
and can be either mandatory or voluntary. -'3 In fact, the majority of
198. Id. The Austrian restrictions on tropical timber imports cannot be distinguished
from the Mexican-Tuna Dolphin case on the basis of multilateral negotiations. Assumin",
arguendo, that the Austrians first attempted to voice their concerns within the ITr0%
framework, the negotiations had not yet been broken off and the dialogue continued, al-
beit at a slow pace. This author believes that a GATT panel examining the validity of
Austria's restrictions would require that multilateral negotiations in the ITr0 b2 entirely
terminated before finding Austria's unilateral import restrictions "necessary." See dizcuz-
sion supra subpart VI(C).
199. Varangis, supra note 3, at 16.
200. I.
201. JOHNSON & CABARLE, supra note 184, at 4; accord Varangis, supra note 3, at 16.
202. See, e.g., EC Eco-Label Program, supra note 155 (public mandatory labeling pro-
gram imposed by EC); JoHNsoN & CABARL, supra note 184, at 23-30 (private voluntary
labeling programs). The U.S. Congress has attempted to pass mandatory labeling la v3 on
several occasions. See, e.g., H.R. 2854, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (referred to as th2
"Tropical Forest Consumer Information and Protection Act of 1991").
203. See Varangis, supra note 3, at 20.
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labeling laws to date seem to be voluntary.204 Among other consider-
ations, 20 5 it appears that the distinction between "mandatory" and
"voluntary" may have significant implications for an environmental
labeling law's ultimate legality under the GATT.
It is important to remember that consumption-related standards
are not prohibited under the GATI so long as they are applied in a
non-discriminatory fashion between domestic goods and imports.
2°6
At least tentatively, mandatory labeling laws as applied to tropical
timber appear to be prohibited under GATT because they unjustifi-
ably discriminate between "like" timber products under the "soft"
MFN and NTO requirements contained in the preamble of article
XX.207 If this conclusion is correct, then much of the discussion on
import bans and boycotts applies here with equal force.
On the other hand, the outcome of the Mexican Tuna-Dolphin
dispute indicates that while countries are likely to fail in their efforts
to enforce their preferred PPMs at an extraterritorial level, they can
have domestic laws requiring the labeling of products with informa-
tion on how much their production affects the environment. 20 8 Mex-
ico, in that case, challenged the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act, which regulates the use of the term "dolphin-safe"
on tuna fish cans. In that instance, the panel found the law to be con-
sistent with the GATT.2"9 The problem is that mandatory labeling
laws as applied to tropical timber would have to overcome the higher
hurdle of discrimination in favor of "like" temperate wood products, a
problem not present in the Mexican Tuna-Dolphin case. In contrast,
environmental labeling laws introduced on a voluntary basis are al-
most certainly legal under the GATT because they are undertaken on
a cooperative basis merely to enhance consumer awareness rather
than to deny the imported product's entry into the local market. 210 It
is ironic that the very proliferation of voluntary labeling programs
may act to confuse consumers rather than enhance their environmen-
204. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[OECD], ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD CouNmIEs 43-70 (1991) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING].
205. Id. at 34 (discussing hypothetical violations of GAT articles LX(1) and X(1)).
206. Varangis, supra note 3, at 20.
207. Jackson, supra note 139, at 1240; see also OTA, supra note 36, at 43 (observing that
"[r]eplacing the [unilateral] restriction with a labeling scheme, by which imports would all
be permitted but customers would be informed of how the wood was harvested, would
lessen the chances of a conflict with GAT") (emphasis added).
208. See Jackson, supra note 139, at 1240-41.
209. Mexican Ina-Dolphin Report, supra note 197, 11 5.41-5.44.
210. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING, supra note 204, at 33.
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tal awareness.2 1' Some economists also argue that labeling programs
generate "perverse results from an environmental perspective,"21' 2
but, in any case, additional research is needed.
In sum, the majority of unilateral restrictions on the international
trade in tropical timber products are most likely illegal under the
GATT because they discriminate unjustifiably, apply extraterritori-
ally, and constitute unnecessary non-tariff barriers. 13 GAIT panel
practice lends additional credence to this conclusion.
Moreover, from an environmental perspective, these well-inten-
tioned measures have at best a marginal impact on preventing tropical
deforestation. At worst, these efforts actually contribute to the prob-
lem, making them environmentally counterproductive exercises in
unilateralism.
IX. CONCLUSION
Perhaps one of the most controversial topics in envronmental
policy today concerns the trend in which trade instruments are used as
"big sticks" with which to achieve important environmental objec-
tives 14 As this Article has attempted to illustrate, tropical forests
and trade policy lie at the heart of this too-often acrimonious dispute.
More specifically, this Article has tried to demonstrate that, at
least as currently contemplated, unilateral attempts to impose envi-
ronmentally motivated restrictions on tropical timber products from
the developing world are largely prohibited under GATT and raise
well-founded fears of eco-imperialism. Consequently, these measures
should not be used, for while the process of harvesting tropical forests
in a sustainable manner to prevent deforestation is a laudable goal
that should be encouraged, the primary forum for the regulation of
211. Additionally, in order to be found GATr consistent, this particular unilateral
trade restriction should not be undertaken if the producers are unwilling or unable to sub-
scribe to any certification criteria undertaken pursuant to the "voluntary" labeling law.
JOHNSON & CABARLE, supra note 184, at 13. This is true because some tropical timber
harvesters, especially smaller and undercapitalized operations, cannot afford the initial
startup costs (ag., training and monitoring) that must be expended in order to comply with
a labeling program's definition of sustainability. Id.
212. Varangis, supra note 3, at 19.
213. If the recent Rio Earth Summit is any indication, the majority of the international
community will likely support the GATTs conclusion that unilateral measures should ba
discouraged. See Forest Principles, supra note 105, at 887 ("Unilateral measure3. incom-
patible with international obligations or agreements, to restrict andfor ban [the] interna-
tional trade in timber or other forest products should be removed or avoided,").
214. Jacques de Miramon & Candice Stevens, The Trade/Environment Policy Balance,
176 OECD OBSERVER, June 1992, at 25.
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tropical forests lies at the international level. Primary responsibility at
the multilateral level, however, does not preclude all unilateral ac-
tion-nor does the GATT.
One of the simplest ways that unilateral action by Austria and
others could be made consistent with the GATT is by expanding these
efforts to encompass all timber products, no matter what their origin.
Unilateral measures consistent with the GATT should be encouraged
because they may lend impetus to much needed reforms at the multi-
lateral level. Interest has also been expressed in innovative alterna-
tives, such as levying a tax on carbon dioxide emissions or a "carbon
tax." '215 Such a program would generate the financial resources neces-
sary for major programs related to the conservation of tropical
forests.216
Whether the members of the international community including
the GATT's contracting parties will, in the near future, find the collec-
tive resolve needed to mend the existing juncture between tropical
forests and trade policy remains to be seen.
215. JoHNsoN, supra note 7, at 47.
216. Id.
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